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JOYCE, WITTGENSTEIN, AND THE PROBLEM OF
 
REPRESENTATION; OR WHY JOYCE WROTE
FINNEGANS WAKE
Robert McNutt
The University
 
of Tennessee at Chattanooga
“Signatures of all things,” says Stephen Dedalus in the opening
 
lines of the Proteus section of
 
Ulysses, “I  am here  to  read... coloured  
signs. Limits of the diaphane ... in bodies.”1 As Stephen walks
 along Sandymount strand, having begun his exile from Mulligan’s
 tower, he
 
contemplates the central problem for himself as an artist: the  
relationship between things and signs, between worldly objects and
 their signatures in language. How, Stephen asks, can things mean?
 The world, despite its protean appearance, must have a static reality
 behind it. Just as colored signs (“snotgreen, bluesilver, rust”) are the
 surface qualities of real
 
bodies (presumably sea, sky, and the beach on  
which Stephen walks), so must artistic expression be the signature for a
 universal reality. One of the central concerns in Joyce’s work is the
 shaping of things, as empirical objects, into the signatures of artistic
 expression through language,
 
how one can represent the other.
As a parallel way of approaching this theoretical question in
 Joyce’s work, I also intend to examine Ludwig Wittgenstein’s
 
Tractatus  
Logico-Philosophicus.2 I wish to suggest that Wittgenstein and Joyce
 explore the same theoretical issues concerning language and the
 possibility of representation. The
 
Tractatus “ is not concerned with  the  
meaning of individual signs per se, but rather with how relationships
 are stated to hold between objects in the empirical world through the
 use of signs.”3 The problem facing Wittgenstein and Joyce—that of
 representation—is precisely the same. I am not suggesting that
 Wittgenstein
 
and Joyce  are part of any one-to-one relationship of cause-  
and-effect influence
 
(despite the fact that the Tractatus and Ulysses were  
both published in 1921),
 
but rather that an analysis of the Tractatus can  
help historicize
 
the theoretical strategies in Joyce’s  work.
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is broken into seven sections, each
 composed
 
of a series of carefully constructed axioms which build one  
upon another. Often the assertions of one section alter or reinterpret
 those which came before them (Wittgenstein himself compared the
 process to a series of ladders which are to be thrown away once one has
 climbed them). The Tractatus begins
 
with the  assertion that “The world  
is everything that is the case” (1.0), and that it divides into “facts”
 which are non-linguistic. Wittgenstein then turns to the “pictures we
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make for ourselves” of the facts—propositions or sentences—and
 
explores the semantic relationship between facts and propositions.
 Wittgenstein holds that meaning is possible only if the proposition 
is
 a  
picture of
 
the facts—a literal model. (This was suggested to him, so  
the story goes, by dolls and toy cars used to reconstruct an automobile
 accident in a courtroom.) The elements of a proposition, then, have the
 same logical
 
form as do facts: the logical form of representation. Just  
as toy 
cars 
and dolls represent the  situation of an accident, to understand  
the logical form of
 
a proposition is to understand the logical form of  
the world: “there must
 
be something identical in a  picture and what  it  
depicts, to enable one to be a picture of the other at all” (2.161). In
 order to verify propositions, then, one must look to the world (rather
 than, say, a dictionary) because propositions, if true, are pictures of the
 facts of 
the
 world.
Once Wittgenstein demonstrates the representational relationship
 between propositions and facts, he raises the ante and begins to
 seriously question whether language can transmit
 
such inquiries. Even  
though language can represent the world, it cannot make sense of the
 world, for
 
“a  picture  cannot, however, depict its representational form: 
it displays it” (2.172). 
In
 other words, the relationship between  
language and the world cannot be put into words, just as the
 relationship between an artist and
 
his painting is not directly displayed  
in the painting itself. Values ad ethics, therefore, cannot be expressed,
 for
 
“in it [the world] no value exists—and  if it did  exist, it  would have
no
 
value” (6.41). To  make sense  of the world one  would have to climb  
outside the world, which for Wittgenstein 
is
 illogical and therefore  
impossible. He adds that “Here it 
can
 be seen that solipsism, when its 
implications
 
are  followed  out strictly, coincides  with pure realism,” and  
philosophical investigations, because they try to be
 
ethical and outside  
the
 
world, are senseless. Wittgenstein then concludes the Tractates by  
applying this dictum to his won work: "What we cannot speak about
 we must pass over in silence” (7.0). Wittgenstein thereafter abandoned
 philosophical investigations completely for nine years, and published
 but one
 
essay until his  death thirty years later.
So to
 
return to Joyce, the problems facing Stephen Dedalus in the  
opening of Ulysses are the same problems facing Wittgenstein in the
 opening
 
arguments of the Tractatus: the relationship between  language  
and
 the 
world. The young Dedalus  in Portrait struggles through a series 
of crises which involve his own private, artistic relationship between
 himself
 
as artist and his world: first his family, then his church, and  
finally his country and the question of Irish nationalism. These three
 spheres revolve around young Dedalus in a series of hierarchical circles
 of language, for it is
 
language  and its power  to represent things through  
signs that continually obsess Stephen and attract
 
him to the  rhetoric of  
2
Studies in English, New Series, Vol. 6 [1988], Art. 24
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/studies_eng_new/vol6/iss1/24
230 JOYCE AND WITTGENSTEIN
the pulpit and the political platform. Even 
as
 a grammar school student  
at
 
Clongowes, Stephen tries to articulate the relationship to his world  
through
 
language as he writes in  the flyleaf of his geography  book:
Stephen Dedalus
 
Class of Elements
 Clongowes Wood College
 Sallins
 County Kildare
 Ireland
 Europe
 The World
The Universe (Portrait, 
p.
 14)
Beyond the universe 
is
 God, whose relationship to the  young schoolboy  
is also linguistic:
God was God’s name just as his name was Stephen. Dieu
 
was the French for God and that was God’s name too; and
 when anyone prayed to God and said Dieu then God knew at
 once that it was a French person praying. But though there
 were different names for God in all the different languages
 in the world and God understood what all the people who
 prayed said in the different languages still God remained
 always 
the
 same and God’s real name was God. (Portrait,  
p. 16)
Now aside from the humorous naivete of Stephen’s schoolboy logic,
 
the essence of is question contains a key Joycean idea: the power of
 words o name and
 
make  distinctions. In order to understand his world,  
to place values on it, Stephen must posit a God outside his world to
 give the hierarchy meaning. Words can represent logically and
 truthfully the world
 
because language and reality share the same form:  
God knows his names among the languages and words are his form.
 Stephen in a sense doesn’t struggle with God—he struggles with signs,
 names, the instruments of God if you like. But despite the struggle,
 notice that Stephen never questions the relationship between signs and
 things, only the relationship between signs themselves. The
 representational quality of language is still possible; words can still
 make sense
 
of the world.
Furthermore, as Stephen matures and faces the oratory of 
the clergy in Book III of Portrait, it is again the representational power of
 language which haunts him. Feeling the pull of the sermons, the
 shame of his sins and his need for confession, Stephen again confronts
 the nature of signs and their relationship to things. Stephen’s struggle
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with the church is a struggle against rhetorical manipulation and the
 
power of language, for the point of the chapter is not so much that
 Stephen “sins,” but rather it focuses on the power of the church in
 making Stephen submissive to its orthodoxy, an orthodoxy of words.
 Returning from the chapel after a sermon on Hell, for example, Stephen
 cries:
Every word for him! It was 
true,
 God was almighty. God  
would call him now ... He had died . . . —Hell! Hell!
Hell! Hell! Hell! (Portrait, 
p.
 125)
It is the cadence of the words that terrifies; Stephen’s torment lies in
 
signs, not things.
Stephen’s predicament is similar to a series of propositions from
 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus:
Objects make up the substance of the world, That is why
 
they cannot be composite (2.021).
If the world had no substance, then whether 
a proposition had sense would depend upon whether another
 proposition was true (2.0211).
In that case we could not sketch out any picture, of the
 
world 
(true
 or false) (2.0211).
It is obvious 
that
 an imagined world, however different it  
may be from the real one, must have something—a form—
 in common with it (2.022).
What 
a
 picture, of whatever form, must have in common  
with reality, in order to depict it—correctly or
 incorrectly—in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the
 form of reality (2.18).
Wittgenstein at this point in the Tractatus shares the same views 
as 
young
 
Dedalus: pictures of the  world (in Stephen’s case  God  and Hell) 
share the same logical form as the world itself. Stephen’s torment lies
 in his choice of pictures which represent the world, with signs not
 
things.
 And strongly implied in Stephen’s awareness of his sin is the a  
priori notion that words can logically
 
and truthfully represent the world.
Conversely, if words can imprison Stephen through their
 representation of the world, they can also set 
him
 free: confess and say  
it
 
with words. Confession is his release:
Blinded by his tears and by the light of God’s
 
mercifulness he bent his head and heard the grave words of
 absolution spoken and saw the priest’s hand raised above
 him in forgiveness . . .
4
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He had confessed and God had pardoned him. His soul
 
was made fair and holy once more, holy and happy
 (Portrait, p. 143).
So in Book V of Portrait, when Stephen spells out his aesthetic
 
theory, it comes as no surprise that
 
the artist, “like the God of creation,  
remains within
 
or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, indifferent,  
paring his fingernails” (Portrait, p. 215). Like
 the
 God  on the flyleaf of  
his geography book, Stephen’s artist steps outside the world to make
 sense of it; and like the concentric circles on that same flyleaf, Stephen
 constructs a hierarchy of meaning which moves from objects to the
 stasis of essential beauty. Beauty, Stephen tells Lynch, is 
an
 aesthetic  
universal, independent of specific objects:
Though the same object may not seem beautiful to all
 
people, all people who admire beautiful objects find in
 them certain relations which satisfy and coincide with the
 stages themselves of aesthetic apprehension (Portrait,
 p. 209).
So Stephen’s aesthetics depend upon the representational quality of
 
language—objects, after all, have to depict beautiful forms before he
 can extract their essence—and also upon the ability of language to
 construct hierarchies, to
 
make distinctions and value judgments between  
signs and propositions (drama is the highest form of art, and so on).
 And the omniscient position of the writer is a God’s-eye-view of
 creation. To make judgments about propositions and their relationship
 to things, in Wittgenstein’s view, 
is
 an impossibility because such  
statements are outside the world, extra-logical, and
 
therefore senseless.  
Hierarchies are
 
not possible because:
All propositions are of equal value (6.4).
The sense of the world must lie outside the world (6.41).
And so it is impossible for there to be propositions of
 
ethics. Propositions can express nothing that is higher
 (6.42).
It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same) (6.421).
Stephen’s art 
is
 therefore bound to  fail because he is asking language to  
do things of which it 
is
 not capable.
Another thing Stephen fails to understand
 
(especially in the Proteus  
section, quoted above) is that
 
language is not a mere transparent series  
of labels which represent the world. What language and propositions
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have in common is their logical form, according to Wittgenstein, but
 
language is no sheer “diaphane” of the world as Stephen says in
 Proteus. It is more complex than that:
Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the
 
outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the
 form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of
 the clothing is not designed to reveal 
the
 form of the body,  
but for entirely different purposes (4.002).
At first sight a proposition—one set on the printed
 
page, for example—does not seem to be a picture of the
 reality with which it is concerned. But no more does
 musical notation at first sight seem to be a picture of
 music, nor our phonetic notation (the alphabet) to be 
a picture of our speech.
And yet these sign-languages prove to be pictures, even
 
in the ordinary sense, of what they represent (4.011).
So as Ulysses opens we find Stephen in the 
same
 aesthetic quagmire as 
in Portrait: he cannot reconcile the things of his culture to his art, and
 he fails to recognize that hierarchies of meaning are arbitrary and
 
sens
eless constructions of artificial order.
In broad terms, the artistic aesthetic which Joyce assigns to
 Stephen is the artistic aesthetic of the traditional novel, for the
 traditional novel depends upon the construct
 
of the authorial voice, the  
voyeuristic persona outside the fictional worlds, making distinctions,
 placing values upon 
things
 and viewpoints, judging his characters. For  
what is a plot, after all, other than a series of “author-ized” value
 judgments concerning the significance of fictional events? A narrative
 line reflects the
 
choices made by e the author, the distinctions and value  
judgments placed upon things from outside the world of the book. For
 to posit a particular “point of view,” or to develop a defined “character”
 through the subtle use of carefully chosen detail, 
is
 to create a false  
objectivity, an illusion of truth, an example of Wittgenstein’s
 senselessness.
Hugh Kenner, in his book Joyce’s Voices, reads Ulysses as a
 
conflict between two narrative 
voices
 which correspond to the  Homeric  
voices of muse and poet, 
one
 inner and one outer:
These two narrators command different vocabularies and
 
proceed according to different cannons. At the outset their
 command is evenly matched, and the first three Bloom
 episodes, culminating in “Hades,” exhibit an economical
 weaving of inner and outer, the brisk notation of Bloom’s
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thought and the wonderfully compact narration glinting one
 
against the other.4
But after “Hades,” Kenner says, something happens. These two
 
voices—the voice of lyrical subjectivity and the voice of neutral
 objectivity—begin to conflict, each prone to its own excesses. The
 objective, outer voice which was responsible for the headlines of
 “Aeolus” also controls “Sirens,” and the subjective, inner voice shows
 its excessive stylistic power in “Oxen of the Sun,” giving birth to
 disembodied speech. These two voices
 
are the catechistic questioner and 
answerer in “Ithaca,” and “Penelope” illustrates the triumph of the
 lyrical, subjective voice—objectivity, the explicator’s fiction, is dead.
Kenner’s reading of Ulysses 
is
 very close to what Wittgenstein  
means when he says that:
The limits of my language mean 
the
 limits of my world  
(5.6).
We cannot thing what we cannot think; so what we
 
cannot think we cannot say either (5.61).
This remark provide the key 
to
 the problem, how much  
truth there is in solipsism (5.62).
We have already seen that to go beyond the limits of the world is to
 
attempt the objectivity of God’s eye, and this is as impossible for
 Stephen as it
 
is for Wittgenstein. But not for  Joyce.
It is with the “objective” style of the “Ithaca” section of Ulysses
 that Joyce 
explodes
 the notion  of representation. The long encyclopedic  
catalogues of detail which puzzle so many readers show us that
 Stephen’s aesthetics mean nothing. The protean quality fo the visible
 reveals nothing behind it, just as lists of objects reveal nothing about
 what they are lists of. Frank
 
Budgen writes that “Ithaca” is “the coldest  
episode in an unemotional book. Everything is conveyed in the same
 tone and tempo as if of equal importance. It is for the reader to assign
 human values.”5 But this is not possible even for Budgen. The only
 way he can interpret “Ithaca” 
is
 to fall back on the Homeric parallels  
and compare Bloom to the heroic Odysseus disposing of his suitors:
 “Bloom’s victory in “Ithaca” is to all appearances complete” (Budgen,
 p. 262). Victory? Hero? Budgen, like so many other critics of Joyce,
 cannot resist the temptation to offer interpretations where there are
 none.
The point of “Ithaca” is that Budgen’s “human values,” like
 
Stephen’s aesthetics, are senseless. Consider, for example, one of the
 catalogues in “Ithaca,”
 the
 contents of Bloom’s secret, locked drawer:
7
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What did the first drawer unlocked contain?
A Vere Foster’
s
 handwriting copybook, property of  
Milly (Millicent) Bloom, certain pages of which bore
 diagram drawings marked Palpi, which showed a large
 globular head with five hairs erect, 2 eyes in profile, the
 trunk in full front wit 3 large buttons, 1 triangular foot: 2
 fading photographs of Queen Alexandra of England and of
 Maude Branscombe, actress and professional beauty: a
 Yuletide card, bearing on it a pictorial representation of a
 parasitic plant, the legend Mizpah, the date Xmas 1892,
 the names of 
the
 senders, from Mr and Mrs M. Comerford,  
the versicle: May this Yuletide bring to the, Joy and peace
 and welcome glee: a butt of red partly liquified sealing
 wax, obtained from the stores department of Messrs Hely’s
 Ltd., 89, 90, and 91 Dame Street: a box containing the
 remainder of a gross of gilt ‘J’ pennibs, obtained from the
 same firm; an old sandglass which rolled containing sand
 which rolled . . . (Ulysses, pp. 720-721).
Here is the trivia and clutter of Bloom’s life, and they add nothing to
 
our understanding of Bloom. Who are the Comerfords? In his Notes
 for Joyce, Don
 
Gifford identifies “Mr. and Mrs. M. Comerford—lived at  
Neptune View, 11 Leslie Avenue, Dalkey,” according to Thom's
 Dublin Post Office Directory, 1886.6 Who is Maude Branscombe?
 Again Gifford tells us that she was “an actress with an extraordinary
 reputation for beauty” who sold
 
28,000 photographs of herself in 1885  
(Gifford, p. 325). Now the careful reader also knows that Bloom, in
 “Nausicca,” 
350
 pages earlier, lists Maude Branscombe in a series of  
Irish actresses as he masturbates wile watching Gerty MacDowell, so
 are we to make a connection? Does Bloom masturbate wit the
 photograph as 
well?
 Or did he just happen to keep one of those 28,000  
photographs? Is Bloom “at it again” on the
 
Christmas card too?
Perhaps, perhaps not. And this is precisely my point: these
 catalogues leave us unable to sort through the details to find the
 patterns of meaning, for there are none. The hierarchies of meaning are
 gone. Budgen is half right: everything in “Ithaca” is of equal
 importance, but there
 
are no “human values” to assign them. And to  be  
sure we don’t miss the point, Joyce has Bloom give us the final
 nonsensical
 
catalogue as “Ithaca” closes: “Sinbad the  Sailor and Tinbad  
the Tailor and Jinbad the Jailer ...” and so on to “Xinbad the
 Phthailer” (Ulysses, p. 737). The catalogues themselves degenerate,
 like an engine running on its last drops of gasoline, racing faster and
 faster until it exhausts itself, finally falling silent. The end of “Ithaca”
 was the last writing Joyce did before starting on the Wake, and in the
 chronology of the actual
 
production of  Ulysses, the book ends not with
8
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Molly’s “yes” but rather with the big black
 
Roc’s egg at the close of  
“Ithaca.” (“Penelope,” you may remember, was finished before “Ithaca”
 so the book could be reviewed.)
So as a coda to my discussion I
 
come round at  last to my subtitle:  
why, in theoretical terms, I think Joyce wrote Finnegans Wake. In
 1921, the year of publication of both Ulysses and the Tractatus,
 Wittgenstein packed his bags and headed for the secluded Austrian
 countryside to teach
 fourth
 grade for six years, and Joyce began work on  
the Wake. The Wake, in short, with its babble of undifferentiated
 voices, is Joyce’s alternative to Wittgenstein’s silence. A world
 without distinctions in which all propositions are equal and therefore
 useless was unbearable for Wittgenstein; Joyce
 
embraced  it with comic  
celebration. Louis O. Mink, a philosopher as well as a Wake scholar,
 writes:
Because Finnegans Wake is not about anything but
 
itself, it is, I think, the most consummately nihilistic work
 in any literature. By “nihilism,” I do not mean merely an
 extreme degree of skepticism, rebellion, or destructiveness,
 but rather the complete absence of the capacity to order the
 world by a scale of relative values, by any hierarchy of
 relative importance . . .
In the world of Finnegans Wake . . . everything is of
 
equal value with everything else.7
It’s
 
true. Take,  for example,  the “Anna Livia Plurabelle” episode from  
the Wake, which nearly everyone considers to be the most intelligible
 chapter, largely because Joyce himself made a recording of it. ALP, in
 her role
 
as  the  primary  female persona of the Wake, is, through various  
allusions, identified with Hero, Petrarch’s Laura, Leda, Molly Bloom,
 all the whores in the world, “poor las animas” (her initials reversed),
 anima—any
 
Ma. There is no  distinction; all  these roles  are laid side by  
side, one after the other, with no historical or mythic differentiation.
 The pleasure of reading the Wake, as
 
anyone who  has  tried it knows, is  
unraveling the puns
 
and the allusions—but putting  the individual pieces  
into a coherent, “author-ized” whole is impossible.
Consider the hundreds of puns on river names which run through
 
the “Anna Livia
 
Plurabelle” chapter. They are marvelous to spot and  
work
 
out, but they add nothing “deeper” to the meaning. If you happen  
to know, for example, that Lough Neagh is the largest lake in the
 United Kingdom (which I
 
didn’t—I read it in a crib on the  Wake), then  
the line “how long was he [HCE] kept under loch and neagh” (Wake,
 p. 196.20) 
is
 more fun. How long was HCE under, presumably, lock  
and key (for one is never sure), for his crime of voyeurism or
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exhibitionism, and how long was he under ALP, whose associations
 
seem to be
 
rivers? Neither reading  is primary—they both coexist side  
by side.
Or if you happen to know that the Tombigbee is a river in
 
Alabama 
(I
 do—I was bom there. Joyce read this one in a crib on  
Alabama.), then among the list
 
of presents for ALP’s children the line  
“and
 
a nightmarching hare for Techertim Tombigby” (Wake, p. 210.15)  
appears to make a little more sense. ALP, being associated with
 
water,  
gives birth to other rivers. But I still have no idea what a rabbit
 walking in darkness has to be
 
with  Alabama, even though I spotted the  
pun.
Either way, whether you spot the puns or not, it makes no
 
difference. The allusions and puns are self-contained, and they fit no
larger
 
scheme of reference; they exist independently from their context.  
In philosophical terms, Wittgenstein agrees: “There is no compulsion
 making one thing happen because another has happened” (6.37).
 Things and events can exist independently one from another without
 
a  
hierarchical
 
system of values to relate  them. “Hierarchies are  and must  
be independent of reality” (5.5561), writes Wittgenstein, and the method
 of Finnegans Wake bears this out. The Wake is, according to
 Wittgenstein’s program, a book of perfect realism.
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